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HOW MUCH DOES THAT $8.00 YANKEE
TICKET REALLY COST? AN ANALYSIS OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' EXPENDITURE OF
PUBLIC FUNDS TO MAINTAIN, IMPROVE
OR ACQUIRE AN ATHLETIC STADIUM FOR
THE USE OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAMS
I. Introduction
Since the beginning of the 20th century, social commentators have
acknowledged professional sports as important to the economic and
cultural life of American cities.' The presence of a particular sports
team has become interwoven with its host city; for example, the Yankee pinstripes are one of the elements that make New York "The Big
Apple."' 2 Approximately fifty American cities host major league professional teams in sports such as baseball and football.3 Municipalities
seek the economic and cultural benefits professional sports franchises
can bring,4 and courts have long recognized the benefits professional
sports teams have upon a locality.' Many municipalities have faced
the dilemma of attracting or keeping a professional baseball or foot1. Johnson, MunicipalAdministration and the Sports FranchiseRelocation Issue, 43
PuB. ADMIN. REV. 519, 519 (1983) [hereinafter Sport Franchise].
2. City of New York v. New York Yankees, 117 Misc. 2d 332, 336-37, 458 N.Y.S.2d
486, 490 (1983).
The Yankee pinstripes belong to New York like Central Park, like the Statue of
Liberty, like the Metropolitan Museum of Art, like the Metropolitan Opera,
like the Stock Exchange, like the lights of Broadway, etc. Collectively they are
'The Big Apple'. Any loss represents a diminution of the quality of life here, a
blow to the city's standing at the top, however narcissistic that perception may
be.
Id.
3. Johnson, Economic and Policy Implications of Hosting Sports Franchises:Lessons
from Baltimore, 21 URB. AFF. Q. 411, 411 (1986) [hereinafter Lessons from Baltimore].
4. Sport Franchise,supra note 1, at 519.
5. Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 356 Mass. 775, 795, 250
N.E.2d 547, 558 (1969).
The Legislature may reasonably determine that there are economic, civic, and
social advantages to Boston, to eastern Massachusetts, and to the Commonwealth as a whole, from providing in the largest city in the [s]tate a stadium ...
to provide for audiences sufficient to support enterprises of interest to large
numbers of people ....
Id.; see also Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, 273 Md. 296,
304-05, 328 A.2d 305, 310-11 (1974) (Murphy, C. J., dissenting) (Taxpayer action to
enjoin the respondents from submitting a proposed charter amendment to the voters of
the city was defeated. The amendment, which the voters of Baltimore ultimately adopted,
was construed by the court to prevent the use of city funds in the construction of a new
stadium in Baltimore).
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ball team within the friendly confines of a city or county. 6 Local governments7 have undertaken to acquire new stadiums or to upgrade
existing facilities in order to entice teams to play in their communities.' The acquisition, and subsequent retention, of professional sports
franchises is a significant element in the economic development plans
of many large cities.9 These efforts to acquire, maintain, or renovate
sports stadiums have prompted taxpayer lawsuits to prevent the expenditure of government funds in these endeavors. 10
A local government's authority to borrow or use funds for these
projects derives from appropriate enabling legislation. In all challenges to local governments' economic support for sports stadiums,
the threshold question is whether the project complies or accords with
enabling legislation, starting with the specific language of the applica6. Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, 310 Md. 437, 462-63, 530 A.2d 245, 25758 (1987).
7. Hereinafter, "local government" will be used to denote either a state, county or
municipal government.
8. Kelly, 310 Md. at 463, 530 A.2d at 258 citing MARYLAND SPECIAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE ECONOMY,
ARENA PLAN, FINAL REPORT 143-48 (Sept. 1985).

PROFESSIONAL

SPORTS

In addition to Maryland's financial support for the Baltimore's Memorial Stadium and public ownership of the Cleveland and New Jersey Meadowlands stadiums, the Pittsburgh Stadium Authority owns Three Rivers Stadium; the
Metropolitan Council Sports Facilities Commission owns the Metrodome; the
Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District owns the Louisiana Superdome; the
Tampa Sports Authority owns Tampa Stadium; the City of Irving 'owns Texas
Stadium; the Pontiac Stadium Authority owns Pontiac Silverdome; the Jackson
County (Mo.) Sports Complex Authority owns both Royals Stadium and Arrowhead Stadium; the City of Philadelphia owns Veterans Stadium; King
County (Wash.) owns the Kingdome; the City of Atlanta and the Fulton
County Recreation Authority own The Omni; and the City of Philadelphia
owns the Spectrum.
Id. at 462-63, 530 A.2d at 257-58.
9. Id. at 462, 530 A.2d at 257.
10. See Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 576, 436 P.2d 685,
686-87 (1968) (the city's acquisition of a sports stadium allowed); Brandes v. City of
Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966) (proposed municipal bond issue to finance
project in which local officials agreed to purchase land, construct stadium buildings, and
lease facility to a baseball team for spring training was invalidated as not being for a
public purpose and an unconstitutional lending of public credit to a private corporation);
Hertel v. Racing Comm'r, 68 Mich. App. 191, 194, 242 N.W.2d 526, 527 (1976) (challenge to continued public funding of Pontiac Stadium defeated); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 64, 233 N.E.2d 864, 866 cert. denied, 391 U.S. 601 (1968)
(municipality may construct stadium and rent it to private persons who will derive profits
from stadium); Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 15, 215 A.2d 894, 895 (1966)
(city had the authority to construct a stadium and lease it to a professional sports team).
The Louisiana Superdome survived several challenges including Abbott v. Parker, 259
La. 279, 284, 249 So. 2d 908, 910 (1971); Branton v. State Bond and Tax, 259 La. 313,
314, 249 So.2d 920, 920 (1971); Schwegmann v. Parker, 259 La. 315, 316, 249 So.2d 921,
921 (1971).
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ble constitution or municipal charter.I Against the background of
statutory construction, courts have considered a number of constitutional objections to these projects. In those cases where the project
complied with the enabling legislation, courts have tended to uphold
governmental borrowing and spending for the acquisition, maintenance, and improvement of sports stadiums on constitutional
grounds.' 2 Lack of compliance with enabling legislation is fatal to a
project. However, compliance with such legislation does not assure
the project's legal viability. Even if a project complies with the legislation a court may, nonetheless, rule the project, or the enabling legislation itself, unconstitutional. 3
Part II of this Note reviews the background of the controversy surrounding the expenditure of public funds' 4 for athletic stadiums for
use primarily by professional sports teams and discusses the analyses
courts have developed to determine a project's legality and constitutionality. Part III addresses the economic and policy issues involved
in the expenditure of public funds in stadium projects, and suggests
methods local authorities may use to prevent court challenges of these
projects. Finally, this Note concludes that state governments, or their
political subdivisions, should expend funds to acquire and maintain
sports stadiums as long as they: (1) weigh certain intangible factors,
in addition to the direct monetary expenses and revenues when developing the cost/benefit analysis of a stadium; (2) provide stadium authorities with proper guidelines for managing the stadium in an effort
to protect the public's interests in the stadium; and (3) require substantial private financing.
II. To Spend or Not to Spend, That is the Question
Many local governments view hosting professional sports teams as
a significant part of their economic development programs.' 5 Before
agreeing to locate their teams in a given community, franchise owners
have demanded public subsidies.' 6 Owners have gravitated toward
11. A discussion of specific enabling legislation is beyond the scope of this Note, except where the language of the legislation is explicitly addressed in court opinions and is
material to the holding.
12. See Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 27, 171 N.E. 606, 607-08
(1930); Bazell, 13 Ohio St. 2d at 72, 233 N.E.2d at 871; Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 580-81,
436 P.2d at 688-89; Martin, 420 Pa. at 23, 215 A.2d at 898-99.
13. Brandes, 186 So. 2d at 12.
14. The projects discussed herein involve the use of either existing funds or bond
proceeds. The term "public funds" will be used to mean either of these sources unless
otherwise indicated.
15. See Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 411.
16. Id.; see also infra notes 43-54, 61-86 and accompanying text.
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those cities with relatively new, modern and, in many cases, domed
stadiums."7 To make their cities more attractive to team owners,
many local governments have gambled and constructed stadiums
without first securing a tenant.1 8 Taxpayer suits challenging such stadium projects have become a significant factor to be considered by
local governments when designing their economic development
plans. 19
A.

Stadium Acquisition: The Houses that John Q. Public Builds

A majority of sports stadiums and arenas in which professional
sports teams play are publicly owned. 20 The first step in many local
business development plans is the construction of a stadium.2 In the
late 1970s and early 1980s local governments spent approximately
$850 million to construct new sports facilities and renovate existing
22
stadiums and arenas.
There are strong policy arguments on both sides of the question of
whether public funds should be used to finance stadium projects.2 3 On
one hand, professional sports play a major role in the cultural life of
modern society and there is a great public desire for sports facilities.2 4
Watching baseball and football games is a national pastime in the
United States; these spectator sports provide public relaxation and entertainment. 25 Local government officials argue that there are sound
economic reasons for subsidizing sports stadiums. 26 These reasons include increased economic activity directly and tangentially related to
the presence of a stadium and the events held in the stadium.27
On the other hand, there are indications that the goal of increased
economic activity is not achieved by investment in sports stadiums. In
17. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
19. See generally infra notes 93-244 and accompanying text.
20. Baade, Is There an Economic Rationale for Subsidizing Sports Stadiums, 13
Heartland Inst. Pol'y Study No. 2 (1987).
21. See Baim, Comparison of Privately & Publicly Owned Sports Arenas and Stadiums,
6 Heartland Inst. Pol'y Study No. 1 (1985).
22. Id.
23. See Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 412.
24. See Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, 270 N.W.2d 749, 75355 (Minn. 1978).
25. Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 69, 233 N.E.2d 864, 869 (1968),
quoting Cleveland v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1951) (Chief
Justice Taft quoted his opinion in a prior case in which the court held that the use of the
Cleveland stadium represented a use for public purpose, although the use was not exclusively for public purposes).
26. See Baade, supra note 20, at 1.
27. Id. at 12; see also infra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
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a recent study, one economist found no correlation between the presence of a sports stadium or arena and local long-term economic
growth. 28 The author of the study concluded that: (1) spending at professional sports events "diverts dollars from other leisure activities"
and (2) stadium construction adds income to a local economy only in
the short term. 29 In the long run, the presence of sports stadiums encourages a switch in economic activity from the manufacturing sector
to the service sector.3 °
Comparing the construction costs of publicly owned stadiums with
those of privately owned stadiums, a second economist concluded that
privately owned facilities were built more economically and efficiently. 31 Privately owned stadiums were also more efficiently operated than publicly owned stadiums.3 2 Examples of publicly owned
stadium projects that have lost money include the New Orleans
Superdome and the Pontiac Silverdome. 3
Stadiums are expensive to construct and to operate; those that are
not the home of a professional sports team may host major events
infrequently, 4 thereby making it difficult for the stadium to generate
enough revenue to cover its maintenance costs. When a governmentowned stadium cannot cover operating expenses from its revenues,
the taxpayers must foot the bill.3 5 Several major stadiums have generated large losses in the past and continue to do so. These losses must
be covered by the public treasury:3 6 the Oakland Coliseum lost $30
million between 1964 and 1984; the Metrodome in Minnesota lost
$1.8 million every year during the early 1980s; the New Orleans
Superdome incurred deficits of between $3 million and $5 million dollars per year for the first nine years of its existence.3 7 Taxpayers in
California, Minnesota and Louisiana have had to cover the operating
losses of local stadiums.3 "
Despite these warning signs, local governments have gone forward
28. Baade, supra note 20, at 12-18. The author analyzed income and population data
of areas with professional football and baseball teams against general economic factors.
See id.
29. Id. at 12-18.
30. Id.
31. Baim, supra note 21, at 3.
32. See Baade, supra note 20, at 5-8.
33. Id. at 5.
34. See Alm, Sports Stadiums: Is the U.S. Overdoing It?, 96 U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., May 21, 1984, at 51, 52 [hereinafter Aim].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. The Pontiac Silverdome also
has experienced losses. Id.
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and built stadiunis without having a signed tenant, hoping that they
would attract one.39 Occasionally the gamble pays dividends. For example, Charlotte, NC, Minneapolis, MN, Miami, FL, and Orlando,
FL, all were finalists for National Basketball Association franchises
because stadiums were being erected.' The Hoosier Dome in Indiana
was built before Robert Irsay, owner of the Colts, agreed to relocate
there from Baltimore.4 ' Also, major league baseball franchises have
been granted to Miami and Denver after these cities undertook con42
struction of stadiums.
B.

Sports Franchise Acquisition: If You Build It, We Shall Come

Despite franchise instability and escalating demands by team owners for increased- subsidies such as stadium improvements, lower
rents, and tax incentives, many cities continue to pursue .sports
franchises. 43 During the 1980s, Los Angeles, Phoenix and Indianapolis successfully induced team owners to shift their National Football
League franchises from long-standing host cities. Los Angeles acquired the Raiders from Oakland, 44 Phoenix acquired the Cardinals
from St. Louis 45 and, after a bidding war, Indianapolis captured the
Colts from Baltimore.46 The City of Anaheim made a gratuitous
transfer of a parcel of land valued at $25 million to the Los Angeles
Rams to persuade the team to move from downtown Los Angeles to
Anaheim.47
On the other hand, several host cities have faced the loss of major
league sports teams. In order to keep franchises in their cities, local
officials have granted a number of taxpayer subsidies to team owners.48 These subsidies include below market rent, tax exemptions and
39. See Recio, Build an Arena Now, Get a Team Later - Maybe, Bus. WK., April 20,
1987, at 90.
40. Id. A review of any daily general circulation newspaper will show that all four
cities hosted NBA franchises at the time of this writing.
41. See Suddenly Everyone Wants to Build a Superdome, Bus. WK., Dec. 5, 1983, at
110, 112.
42. See Recio, supra note 39, at 90.
43. Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 411-12.
44. During the past several years there were discussions about the Raider franchise
returning to Oakland early in the 1990s. Ostler, Jilted by Raiders, Irwindale's Life is the
Pits, The National Sports Daily, Feb. 23, 1990, at 19; see also infra notes 61-81 and
accompanying text.
45. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 13, 1990, at 4 (chart).
46. See Alm, supra note 34, at 51.
47. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 650 n.28 (1989) [hereinafter Monopoly].
48. See id. at 649.
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tax rebates.49 The State of Louisiana agreed to remit to the team all
revenue the Saints generate by playing in the Superdome.50 This action, combined with the state's abolition of an amusement tax on tickets, transfers $2.5 million per year from the state's taxpayers to the
Saints." Philadelphia spent $30 million to construct skyboxes for the
Eagles52 with the agreement that the Eagles would retain the revenue
from the boxes.53 The City of Philadelphia provided the Phillies with
$1 million dollars for a new scoreboard, allowed the team to construct
special baseball suites, and assumed annual loan payments of
$745,000 on behalf of the team. 54 The agreement also permitted the
team to retain most of the revenue earned by the suites.
There is little concrete, readily available information about the actual, bottom-line effects on an individual city of hosting a sports
team. 5 Much of the debate on the issue of municipalities hosting
sports franchises centers on considerations that are difficult to measure, such as indirect economic benefits and intangible social goods
such as civic pride. 6
Citizens and municipal leaders favoring the presence of a sports
team in their city, despite the related public costs, base their position
on the expected economic benefits, improved civic pride, and increased prestige for the city that result from a team's presence.5 7 The
expected economic benefits include new business activity with the resultant increase in jobs and concomitant income tax revenue.5 8 It is
arguable that the relocation of the Dodgers from New York to Los
Angeles had no major effect on either city;59 however, many smaller
cities have been willing to invest money in building stadiums with the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 650 n.28. The Saints lease the Superdome at a rental price tied to ticket
sales. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In March 1990 the Phillies announced negotiations with Philadelphia for the
team's purchase of Veteran's Stadium for an estimated sales price of $50 million - $70
million. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 30, 1990 at 39, col. 2. The team expressed a
desire to make major capital improvements to the stadium; however, they were concerned
that the city could not afford to finance the project. Id.
55. Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 412. Economists have begun to analyze
the information collected from a number of cities and have tried to develop models that
other cities can use. See generally id.; Baim, supra note 21; Sport Franchise,supra note 1;
Baade, supra note 22.
56. Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 412.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Salisbury, Organized Sports and Urban Life, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 327, 330 (1988)
(Book Review).
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hope that there would be a significant impact upon the local
economy. 6°
Obviously, there is no guarantee that a city will successfully lure a
professional team. The relocation of the Raiders illustrates the pitfalls
local governments face when pursuing sports franchises. The Raiders
moved from Oakland, CA to Los Angeles in 1982.61 In 1987, the team
announced that they might leave Los Angeles and relocate to
Irwindale, CA, a town of 1,080 people.62 Irwindale gave the Raiders a
$10 million deposit to induce the move,6 a which the Raiders were to
60. See generally Recio, supra note 40, at 90.
Baseball's spring training season illustrates the relationship between professional sports
and local economies. In a 1987 study, the Florida Department of Commerce prepared a
study quantifying the economic impact of baseball on the state's economy. The National
Sports Daily, Feb. 13, 1990, at 8 (chart). The study indicated several sources of income
the state received during the Major League Baseball spring training season. Fans were
estimated to spend $3.4 million at ballparks during the 30-day season, which translated
into $189,000 per team. Id. The 18 baseball teams which play in Florida during spring
training accounted for $11.9 million or $661,000 per team. Id. Non-resident travel parties
in which at least one member attended one game contributed $282.6 million. Id. The
study attributed spring training with providing 378,000 full-time and part-time employment positions with concomitant income of $3.1 billion. Id.
This should be contrasted with the public costs associated with spring training. Dunedin, the Florida city that hosts the Toronto Blue Jays during the spring, floated bonds to
finance a 6,300-seat stadium which cost $2.25 million to build. The National Sports
Daily, Feb. 13, 1990, at 8, col. 2. Debt service on the bonds was to come from the city's
receipt of a percentage of ticket sales, parking revenue and concessions sales over a 10 11 year period. Id. The major league baseball labor dispute during the 1990 spring training season clouded the prospect for the city to reach the projected revenue level. Id.
The spring training facility the New York Mets built in Port St. Lucie, Fla. was the
catalyst for the town's phenomenal growth. Id. at 9. The population of the town grew
from 14,000 to 55,000 in ten years. Id. In a three year period 30 restaurants and three
hotels opened. Id. But the infrastructure of the town suffered because of this growth. The
existing roads could not handle the increased traffic and had to be expanded. Id. To
accomplish the expansion of a major thoroughfare the town planned, as of March 1990,
to use eminent domain to acquire portions of residential land. Id. As a consequence, most
houses along this roadway were for sale. Id. The town's schools were ill-equipped for the
rapid increase in students and portable schools had to be added to reduce the studentteacher ratio to an acceptable level. Id.
The economy of Port St. Lucie is very dependent on the Mets; the aforementioned
labor dispute was predicted to cause the town to lose $1.5 million for every week lost
during spring training. Id. The dispute caused the spring training season to be reduced
from six weeks to three weeks. The National Sports Daily, Apr. 10, 1990 at 22, col. 1.
61. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 13, 1990, at 4 (chart). For a discussion of the
litigation Oakland instituted to prevent the Raiders from leaving, see City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60, 646 P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982); see also, Note,
Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1329 (1986); Note, The Professional
Sports Community Protection Act: Congress' Best Response to Raiders?, 38 Hastings L.J.
345 (1987).
62. Ostler, Jilted by Raiders, Irwindale's Life is the Pits, The National Sports Daily,
Feb. 23, 1990, at 19.
63. Id.
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keep if the town could not construct a stadium. 6' Irwindale could not
arrange financing to build the stadium by the deadline set in the
agreement and Al Davis, the Raiders' owner, kept the $10 million.65
In addition to the deposit, the town expended another $10 million in
appraisals, reports and legal fees. 66 The town's actions were in part
based on a financial report that the Raiders would bring $200 million
into the area each year.67 Including Oakland, four cities had entered
69
the competition for the team;6 Irwindale's offer was $155 million.
Irwindale uitimately lost because Davis was concerned about the
town's ability to construct a stadium.7° Irwindale has little to show
for its $20 million plus "investment" in the Raiders.
In 1989, Sacramento, CA voters approved a bond issue to build a
stadium for the Raiders. 7 ' The bond approval expired in February
1990 when Al Davis did not accept the offer.72 On March 12, 1990, Al
Davis announced that the team would return to Oakland.7 3
In an attempt to recapture the Raiders, officials from the City of
Oakland and Alameda County agreed to guarantee the team a package valued in excess of $600 million. 74 The package included $146
million in guaranteed ticket sales revenue for the first five years of the
fifteen-year contract, a $55 million franchise fee, and $53 million in
stadium renovations. 75 The funding sources for this package included
revenues on luxury boxes and certain well-situated seats, and annual
fees on certain other seats.7 6 In addition, local officials announced the
intent to sell the stadium's name for at least $10 million77 and, using a
more traditional funding source, Oakland planned to issue $127 million in bonds. 78 However, the Raiders balked at submitting the con64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. In August 1990, it was announced that the City of Fontana, Calif. had submitted a bid to host the Raiders franchise. The National Sports Daily, Aug. 19, 1990, at 35,
col. 1.
69. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 13, 1990, at 4 (chart).
70. See Ostler, Jilted by the Raiders, Irwindale's Life is the Pits, The National Sports
Daily, Feb. 23, 1990, at 19.
71. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 13, 1990, at 4 (chart).
72. Id.
73. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 13, 1990, at 4.
74. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 14, 1990, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The National Sports Daily, Mar. 3, 1990, at 5, col. 6.
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tract to a public referendum demanded by opponents of the project.79
In September, 1990, Al Davis announced his intention to allow the
Raiders to remain in Los Angeles for twenty additional years.8 0 The
agreement between the Raiders and the Los Angeles Coliseum authorities, and subject to the approval of governmental agencies, calls
for the owners to make renovations to the Los Angeles Coliseum at an
8
estimated total cost of $145 million. 1
Critics of the trend for cities to accede to the demands of franchise
owners for increased subsidies argue that the only beneficiaries of
such subsidies are wealthy team owners.82 One method by which a
local community can maintain a sports franchise without a large outlay of public funds is to have the team or the team's owner have a
financial stake in the stadium. 3 In the twenty-two franchise moves
79. The National Sports Daily, Apr. 17, 1990, at 33, col. 3. A group of 33,000 Oakland voters signed a petition calling for a referendum on the proposed Raider project. Id.
80. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1990, at D30, col. 1.
81. Id. The Coliseum is publicly owned but managed by a private firm. Id. In addition, the Coliseum Commission dropped a $58 million suit against the Raiders. Id. The
suit, alleging a breach of contract by the Raiders, was brought in 1987 as a response to
the announcement that the Raiders intended to move to Irwindale. Id.; see supra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
The subsidies a given team will receive from a municipality will vary from city to city
and from contract to contract. In addition to the Raiders example, the opinion in Brandes
v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 8-9 (Fla. 1966) provides another illustration of
subsidies sports teams can obtain from local governments. Under the lease in Brandes,
the city was to furnish peripheral athletic facilities and an infrastructure to support the
stadium, as well as the stadium. Id. at 8. These other facilities included four additional
baseball fields, lighting, a sliding pit, a running track, and an observation tower. In addition, the city was to provide space for parking, all maintenance, and utilities. Id. Because
the stadium in Brandes was to be used by a baseball team for spring training, the City of
Deerfield Beach was also to provide housing for 274 people, dining facilities for 180 people and a kitchen. Id. at 8. The court's decision that the project did not meet public
purpose criteria was affected by the level of benefits the city was called upon to provide.
See id.
Another example of the concessions sought and received by team owners involves the
move of the Baltimore Colts. To acquire the NFL Colts, Indianapolis had to guarantee
minimum annual ticket sales of 45,000 for 12 years, contribute $4 million for a team
training facility, and provide a ten-year, $12.5 million loan at a below market interest
rate. Aim, supra note 34, at 51. In fact, the offer Baltimore made to keep the Colts was
greater than that of Indianapolis. Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 424. Had the
Colts remained in Baltimore, the team owner would have received a ten-year, $15 million
loan at 6.5% interest, with local business leaders pledging more than $500,000 annually
to fill the gap between the below market rate and the prime rate. Id. at 414. In addition,
the Colts would have received guaranteed average ticket sales of at least 43,000 tickets
per game from local business leaders. Id. The team also would have received an additional $4.4 million in cash from a sale-leaseback arrangement for the Colts' training facility. Id. at 414. Benefits packages such as these face increased public scrutiny.
82. Sport Franchise,supra note 1, at 412.
83. Baim, supra note 21, at 8-9.

1991]

STADIUM FINANCING

between 1970 and 1985 only two involved a move from a privately
owned stadium. 84 Critics also question the magnitude of projected
economic benefits in light of the subsidies that must be expended to
attract a team. 5 There is no solid measurement of the benefits of a
sports stadium; however, as illustrated by the Raiders' deal, many
government officials are willing to invest large sums of public money
on the assumption that the investment has a multiplier effect on the
local economy. 6
C.

Challenges to the Validity of Governmental Expenditures to
Acquire Sports Stadiums

A number of local governments or sports authorities own stadiums
that are used primarily by professional baseball and football teams. s7
Some of the funding mechanisms for these stadium projects survived
constitutional challenges.8 8 The challenges to these sports stadiums
can be grouped into four broad categories: (1) the project lacked a
public purpose justifying the use of government financing; 9 (2) the
project involved the illegal application of a government's credit support to a private entity; 90 (3) the government subdivision exceeded its
statutory borrowing limits with the proposed bond issue; 91 and (4) the
project violated zoning limitations.9 2
1. Public Purpose

One issue courts consider is whether the acquisition of a stadium to
be used for professional sporting events is a public purpose for which
84. Id. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
85. Id.
86. See Salisbury, supra note 59, at 327. The theory is that every $1 spent in acquiring
a sports stadium will bring more than $1 of revenue into the community. Id. at 330.
87. See supra note 8.
88. Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968);
Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971); Branton v. State Bond and Tax
Bd., 259 La. 313, 249 So. 2d 920 (1971); Schwegmann v. Parker, 259 La. 315, 249 So. 2d
921 (1971); Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606 (1930); Martin v.
City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966); Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash. 2d 349,
474 P.2d 247 (1970) (successful challenge to initial site selected for the Seattle
Kingdome); Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973) (unsuccessful
challenge to bond financing for the Kingdome).
89. See infra notes 98-172 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 173-210 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 211-27 and accompanying text.
92. Lake Lucerne Civic Ass'n v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 878 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990); Rolling Oaks Homeowner's Ass'n v. Dade
County, 492 So. 2d 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), review denied by, 503 So. 2d 328
(1987); Norwood-Norland Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Dade County, 511 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied by, 520 So. 2d 585 (1988).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XVIII

the government can legally exercise its fiscal powers.9 3 Many states
restrict government spending to public projects.94 Generally, courts
have allowed legislative arms of local governments wide discretion to
determine how best to promote public welfare and enjoyment.9 These
courts have recognized the right of municipalities to borrow or expend funds in connection with projects relating to public recreational
and amusement facilities, such as sports stadiums.9 6 Judicial construction of "public purpose" has been liberal and has caused an expansion
of what constitutes a public purpose.9 7 In keeping with this trend,
several state legislatures have expressly proclaimed that proposed stadium projects represent a public purpose in an attempt to foreclose
constitutional challenges on public purpose grounds.98
The provision of multipurpose sports stadiums or arenas is not as
clearly a public purpose as supplying housing, mass transportation,
highways, educational facilities and other necessities. 99 Providing
football and baseball stadiums, designed not only for public recreation
but also for substantial private profit, is not a primary or necessary
government function because the private sector could be a substitute
provider.I°° The potential for a substantial profit separates sports stadiums from other public facilities such as parks and beaches that exist
primarily for the use and enjoyment of the public as a whole. For
example, Miami residents rejected a bond referendum to finance reno93. Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968); Alan
v. Wayne County, 388 Mich. 210, 200 N.W.2d 628 (bond issuance invalidated on other
grounds), reh'g denied, 388 Mich. 626, 202 N.W.2d 277 (1972); Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 601 (1968). See supra notes
27-31 and accompanying text.
94. See generally id.
95. See Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 753-54 (Minn.
1978).
96. Ginsberg, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685; Lifteau, 270 N.W.2d 749; Bazell, 13 Ohio
St. 2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864. But see Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
1966); Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 356 Mass. 775, 250
N.E.2d 547 (1969).
97. Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 580, 436 P.2d at 688.
98. See, e.g. Opinionsof the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547; Reyes v. Prince
George's County, 281 Md. 279, 303, 380 A.2d 12, 25 (1977) (challenge by taxpayer to
county revenue bond issuance where the proceeds were to be lent to a partnership to
finance acquisition of an arena defeated); Alan v. Wayne County, 388 Mich. 210, 200
N.W.2d 628, reh'g denied, 388 Mich. 626, 202 N.W.2d 277 (1972); In re County of Erie
v. Kerr, 49 App. Div.2d 174, 177-78, 373 N.Y.S.2d 913, 917 (4th Dept. 1975) (attempt by
town to tax Rich Stadium as private property defeated on grounds that the stadium,
owned by the County of Erie, was still being used for the public purpose for which the
stadium was created).
99. Opinions of the Justices, 356 Mass. at 795-96, 250 N.E.2d at 558.
100. See Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 484-85, 530 A.2d
245, 268 (1987) (dissenting opinion).
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vations to the Orange Bowl three times in twelve years."0 ' Joe Robbie,
owner of the Miami Dolphins team which played its home games in
the Orange Bowl, ultimately financed the construction of a new stadium without the direct allocation of public funds. 102 The opportunity
for economic gain from owning the stadium was likely a greater incentive than the desire to benefit Miami citizens.
Sports arenas do not represent a public purpose if private organizations operate the facilities for profit.'0 3 The public nature of a stadium
is diluted when private parties earn substantial revenues from operating the facility. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Opinions of the
Justices,"° decided that a proposed stadium is not a valid public purpose despite a declaration in the proposed legislation to the contrary. 10 5 In Opinions of the Justices,10 6 the Massachusetts House of
Representatives referred fourteen questions to the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 10 7 These questions related
to a proposed statute which would provide for the financing, construction and operation of a multipurpose stadium near Boston.' 8
The House of Representatives voted to resolve concerns about the
constitutionality of the bill, if enacted, by having the court provide an
advisory opinion.' Among the questions the justices answered was
whether the legislation could contain provisions for bond issuance to
finance the cost of the stadium. A provision of the Massachusetts
Constitution required that public funds be expended only for public
purposes pursuant to a legitimate governmental function."' 0 The legislature questioned whether a proper public purpose would be served by
the stadium thereby justifying the use of public funds or other govern101. Sherrid, Short Yardage, Forbes, March 25, 1985 at 247 [hereinafter Short
Yardage].
102. See infra note 237 and accompanying text; see also Short Yardage, supra note 105.
103. Opinions of the Justices, 356 Mass. at 796, 250 N.E.2d at 558.
If the stadium ... under the proposed legislation can be operated, and if [it]
should in fact be operated, so as in effect to subsidize private organizations operated for profit, then the facilities could not be said to exist for a public
purpose.
Id.; see also Los Angeles County v. Dodge, 51 Cal. App. 492, 501, 197 P. 403, 407 (1921)
(dicta indicating that the generation of profits from the stadium for private persons might
affect the public nature of the stadium).
104. 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547.
105. Id. at 796-99, 250 N.E.2d at 558-60. The statute declared that the purposes of the
project were public ones. Id.
106. Id. at 775, 250 N.E.2d 547.
107. Id. at 755-77, 250 N.E.2d at 547-49.
108. Id. at 778, 250 N.E.2d at 549.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 810, 250 N.E.2d at 564.
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mental benefits such as tax incentives.''
The court was unwilling to find that the project satisfied a governmental objective in the absence of adequate standards and principles
set forth by the local legislature."I2 The justices sought standards to
govern the operation of a stadium to ensure the protection of all the
varied public interests - - including the use of the stadium for activities other than professional sports events - - that the stadium was built

to accommodate.'13
In answering the legislature's questions, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts found that a large multipurpose stadium
could represent a public purpose if the legislation set forth adequate
standards for the expenditure of public funds and the operation of the
facility.114 The justices reviewed the proposed legislation for the presence of provisions which assured the availability of the facility for
civic, educational and other cultural events in addition to the use by
professional sports teams.' I' After this review, the justices concluded
that the proposed statute did not provide adequate safeguards to protect the general public's interest in the project.' 16 The court also
looked for statutory guidance for stadium authorities with respect to
acceptable events to be held in the stadium and to appropriate rental
guidelines. 117 The court found a lack of such standards in the proposed statute. "'
Similarly, a Florida state court held that the negligible advantage to
the community resulting from public support of a private enterprise's
sporting event is not a public or municipal purpose.1 1 9 The court in
Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach 120 found that the value of the benefits the municipality was to provide to the professional baseball team
outweighed the advantages of the stadium to the city.' 2 ' The bond
proceeds were to be employed to acquire land and construct a facility
for the use of the Pittsburgh Pirates during spring training.' 22 Essentially, the Brandes court found that the transaction represented an
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 795, 250 N.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 796-99, 250 N.E.2d at 559-60.
Id. at 797, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
Id. at 795, 250 N.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 797-98, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
Id. at 798, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
Id. at 797, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
Id. at 798, 250 N.E.2d at 559.
Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1966).
186 So. 2d 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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illegal lending of the city's credit to a private corporation. 2 ' In Brandes, a taxpayer successfully challenged a municipal bond issue for the

purpose of financing an athletic stadium."

4

The dispute involved the

validity of the proposed municipal bond which state law required to
be issued only for a public purpose. 2 The court held that the project

did not serve a public purpose because no governmental function was
26
being financed.
A contrary result was reached in Alan v. County of Wayne.' 27 The
court found that a public purpose requirement could be met under the
state's constitution if the stadium's revenues were sufficient to cover
the debt service payments on the bonds.' 28 The plaintiffs brought suit
to test the validity of a stadium bond issuance. Among the plaintiffs'
129
allegations was that the project did not constitute a public purpose.

This argument contained three major points: (1) the stadium was not
a public purpose as defined by the Michigan Constitution; (2) cases
construing state law required a showing that the stadium was an "absolute necessity" prior to construction; and (3) before the stadium

could be built, state law required that competent proof exist that the
stadium would have a positive impact on the local economy - - specifically, an increase in business activity and employment. 30 The court

rejected the lack of public purpose argument on all three points.

3

123. Id. at 12.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 388 Mich. 210, 200 N.W.2d 628, reh'g denied, 388 Mich. 626, 202 N.W.2d 277
(1972).
128. Id. at 356-57, 200 N.W.2d at 699.
129. Id. at 317, 200 N.W.2d at 680.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 317-23, 200 N.W.2d at 681-83. The justices found that a stadium used
solely by a professional sports team could meet the public purpose requirements of the
Michigan constitution if the stadium generated sufficient revenue to cover the principal
and interest payments on the bonds. Id. " 'The requirement of public purpose has been
most rigid when public money or property is involved .... The requirement has been less
rigid when there was no chance the general taxing power could be reached.'" 388 Mich.
at 321, 200 N.W.2d at 682 (quoting City of Gaylord v. Gaylord City Clerk, 378 Mich.
273, 295 n.8, 144 N.W.2d 460, 468 (1966)). The court went on to find that the absolute
necessity rule did not apply to the instant case, construing the rule to relate only to a
government user of a government-owned facility rather than a private user. The absolute
necessity rule governed the construction of facilities by the government when financed by
floating revenue bonds. Only buildings which were to be used for a government purpose
were allowed under the rule. See id. at 321-22, 200 N.W.2d at 682-83. The basis for this
conclusion was that the private user would pay rent to cover the debt service of any
revenue bonds issued. Id. at 321, 200 N.W.2d at 682. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
interpretation that state law required proof of increased business activity as a condition
precedent to stadium construction, but held that, in any event, there was adequate sup-
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Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver 32 is typical of the line of
cases in which courts deferred to legislative determinations regarding
the public purpose within a stadium project. In Ginsberg, a taxpayer
challenged the legality of a bond issue used to finance the acquisition
of a stadium by the City of Uenver. 3 3 The complaint alleged that
there was no public purpose in the acquisition of the stadium.' 34 The
court in Ginsberg adopted a position of extreme deference to the legislative determination that the project could be completed as it served a
public purpose.' 3 There was no independent analysis of the transaction,136and thus, the court permitted the completion of the project as

well. 137
The Alan and Ginsberg courts were concerned about the separation
of powers and did not want to usurp the constitutional role of the
legislative branch. 3 These courts concluded that deciding what constitutes a public purpose is a legislative function. 139 The position
adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the Opinions of the Justices I I provides a better balancing of competing interests than does a position of extreme deference to a legislative
determination of what constitutes a public purpose. The court in
Opinions acknowledged that weight is to be given to legislative determinations. '' The justices concluded, however, that the determination
is not dispositive in the absence of specific standards set forth by the
legislature.' 4 2 Guidelines must be instituted to ensure that the public
interests the legislature considered when making its determination
will be served throughout the life of the project. 4 3
port in the record that increased activity would occur. Id. at 322-23, 200 N.W.2d at 683.
The bond issue, however, was ruled invalid because the structure of the issue caused the
bonds to exceed the authorization granted under Michigan law. Id. at 357, 200 N.W.2d at
699. The statute authorized the issuance of revenue bonds. Id. at 253-54, 200 N.W.2d at
649. The Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that the bonds issued in the instant case
were actually tax bonds, i.e. they would have to be repaid from the government's tax
revenue. Id. at 357, 200 N.W.2d at 699.
132. 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 578, 436 P.2d at 688.
135. Id. at 579-80, 436 P.2d at 688.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 579-81, 436 P.2d at 688-89.
138. SeeAlan, 388 Mich. at 317-18, 200 N.W.2d at 681; Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 579-81,
436 P.2d at 688-89.
139. Id.
140. 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547.
141. Id. at 795, 250 N.E.2d at 558.
142. Id. at 796-97, 250 N.E.2d at 558-59.
143. Id. at 796-97, 250 N.E.2d at 558-59. Three other cases illustrate the deferential
line in which the legislative determination was dispositive. In Meyer v. City of Cleveland,
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Lending Government Credit to Private Persons or Organizations
Provisions in state constitutions prohibit the lending of governmen-

35 Ohio App. 20, 171 N.E. 606 (1930), a taxpayer sought to enjoin the construction of a
sports stadium. After tracing the history of expenditures by governments for sports stadiums back to Classical Greece and Rome, the court found that providing facilities for the
enjoyment of the public was a traditional governmental function. Id. at 26-27, 171 N.E.
at 607. The court held that Cleveland had the right to construct and maintain "public
buildings," and there should not be a legal distinction between a stadium and any other
public facility. Id. at 26-27, 171 N.E. at 608. The holding of the court was that providing
stadiums for public entertainment was a valid public purpose. Id. at 27, 171 N.E. at 608.
Prior to Meyer, Los Angeles County v. Dodge, 51 Cal. App. 492, 197 P. 403 (1921),
was the only American case which addressed a local government's authority to construct
and maintain a stadium. Meyer v. City of Cleveland, 35 Ohio App. 20, 24, 171 N.E. 606,
607. The plaintiff in Dodge had sought an order on behalf of the City and County of Los
Angeles to compel the execution of a lease for land where a stadium was to be built.
Dodge, 51 Cal. App. at 493, 197 P. at 405. There was a dispute among officials of the city
and county governments whether the city, the county, or both, had the ability to undertake the project. This conflict caused individual officials of the city and county to challenge their governments' authority to enter the lease on the ground that the money spent
by the city and county to construct the stadium did not constitute an expenditure for a
public purpose. Id. at 497-98, 197 P. at 406. In holding that the city and county had the
authority to undertake the project, the court adopted a position of extreme deference to
the policy-making function of the legislature. See id. at 498, 197 P. at 406. A legislative
determination that a project had a public purpose would be conclusive upon the court
unless it was apparent, to the court, that the determination was without foundation. Id.
When the Legislature ... proceeds upon the assumption that a matter concerning which it acts is one affecting the public interest or designed to promote the
general welfare, the assumption is conclusive upon the courts, unless it is
plainly apparent to them that the view entertained by the legislative body is
without just foundation.
Id. at 498, 197 P. at 406. In light of its deferential posture, the Dodge court agreed with
the legislative determination that the project was one that affected the public interest. Id.
at 500, 197 P. at 406.
The dissident officials opposed to the lease also argued that the lease did not have a
public purpose because a development association responsible for operating the stadium
could derive a profit from the stadium when it was not in the possession of the city or
county; that is, when no government sponsored events were occurring in the stadium. Id.
at 501, 197 P. at 407. The court, after construing the lease to require revenue derived
from admission charges to be used to maintain the property, found that neither the association nor its members could make a profit under the lease and therefore the use of
public funds in constructing the stadium was not for a private purpose. Id.
In Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 420 Pa. 14, 215 A.2d 894 (1966), a taxpayer sought
to enjoin local officials from enforcing a local ordinance which authorized a loan to build
a sports stadium. The ordinance was upheld by the court, which determined that the
project had a public purpose. Id. at 22-23, 215 A.2d at 898-99. The court found that
construction of a sports stadium was a valid public purpose. Id. at 17, 215 A.2d at 896. In
dicta, the court stated that the use of the stadium by a private enterprise would not negate
the public nature of the stadium. Id. at 18, 215 A.2d at 896. "[T]he ordinance refers not
at all to private enterprise; any objection to the use of the stadium by private enterprise is
therefore premature." Id. This begs the question however, of whether a stadium to be
used primarily by a private enterprise, or the generation of profit from the use of a stadium by a major league team, would change the public nature of the stadium.
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tal credit to private persons to prevent a state or municipality from
becoming enmeshed in priyate enterprise.'" Since a government's
credit-worthiness is supported by its ability to raise taxes to pay its
debts, there is legitimate concern about using tax dollars for nongovernmental purposes.145 Although there is a split of authority, courts
have generally found that the issuance of bonds for the acquisition,
maintenance or improvement of sports stadiums does not violate these
provisions.146 The courts in Bazell v. City of Cincinnati,147 Ginsberg v.
City and County of Denver148 and Alan v. County of Wayne' 49 addressed the issue of the proscribed lending of public credit. 150 In
Bazell, the plaintiff raised a claim under the state constitution that
Cincinnati was illegally lending its credit to the county in order to
enable the county to borrow.' The court construed the constitutional provision as permitting the city to lend its credit to other public
entities, such as the county. 52 The provision did not address one government subdivision lending to another and therefore the court had
the ability to grant broad discretion to the legislature. However, the
principal beneficiary of the financing was the professional baseball
team that was to occupy the stadium. Therefore, the court did not
reach the question of whether this transaction represented an indirect
lending to a private organization.
Where the bonds are self-liquidating revenue bonds, i.e. the income
generated by the underlying project is adequate to cover the debt service on the bond issue, the full faith and credit of the government does
not support the bonds." 3 Consequently there is no lending of public
credit.' 54 The court in Ginsberg v.. City and County of Denver' 55
looked at the anticipated sources of revenue for the debt service in
144. See Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1966).
145. See, e.g., id.
146. See Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685 (1968);
Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 601
(1968); but see, Brandes, 186 So. 2d 6.
147. 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864.
148. 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685; see also supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
149. 388 Mich. 210, 200 N.W.2d 628; see supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text.
150. Bazell, 13 Ohio St. 2d at 65, 233 N.E.2d at 867; Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 576, 436
P.2d at 686; Alan, 388 Mich. at 233, 200 N.W.2d at 639.
151. Bazell, 13 Ohio St. 2d at 71, 233 N.E.2d at 870.
152. Id. at 73, 233 N.E.2d at 871.
153. See Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 581-84, 436 P.2d at 689-91; Alan, 388 Mich. at 324-25,
200 N.W.2d at 683-84.
154. Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 582-83, 436 P.2d at 689-90; Alan, 388 Mich. at 323-24, 200
N.W.2d at 683-84.
155. 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d 685.
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reviewing the proposed bond issue. 56 After declining to review the
legislation's declaration that a stadium project was a public purpose, 57 the court in Ginsberg reviewed the repayment sources anticipated under the ordinance authorizing the bond issue.. 58 The city
ordinance authorizing the project stipulated that the principal and interest were payable solely out of the net revenue produced by the sta-

dium, after subtracting related operating and maintenance
expenses.' 59 The ordinance further stated that the city was not to be
held liable for payments of the principal or interest on the bonds;
these payments were to be made solely from the net revenue derived
from the operation of the stadium." 6° The court upheld the project,'
finding that debt service payments were to come solely from the operation of the stadium; therefore, the local government was not illegally
lending its credit. 62
156. Id. at 577, 436 P.2d at 687.
157. See supra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
158. Ginsberg, 164 Colo. at 577, 436 P.2d at 687.
159. Id. at 577-78, 436 P.2d at 687.
160. Id. at 578, 436 P.2d at 687.
161. Id. at 587, 436 P.2d at 692.
162. Id. at 585, 436 P.2d at 691.
In Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1966), the court found that
the City, by providing the proposed services, would be lending its credit in violation of
the provisions of the state constitution. Id. at 12. The city was committed to the repayment of the bonds even in the event of the default of the other parties in the transaction.
Id. at 8, 9. The court correctly held that the plan would have resulted in the City assuming the obligations of a major league baseball team in the case of the team's default under
the stadium lease.
The Supreme Court of Michigan addressed but did not decide the question whether the
bond issue in Alan v. County of Wayne violated a provision in the state constitution which
proscribed the granting of public credit. 200 N.W.2d at 683-87; MICH. CONST. of 1963,
art. 9, § 18: "The credit of the state shall not be granted to, nor in aid of any person,
association or corporation, public or private, except as authorized in this constitution."
200 N.W.2d at 683. The court concluded that public credit could be granted by the executive or legislative branches in return for adequate consideration. Id. at 684-85. The executive or legislative branch granting the credit would determine the adequate level of
compensation. Id. at 685. However, the court did not identify any provision in the state
constitution that creates an exception to the general prohibition permitting the exchange
of public credit for "adequate consideration." The court therefore sanctioned the sale of
state credit for a price.
The court in Arata v. The Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 254 La. 579, 225
So. 2d 362 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 279 (1970), faced the question of whether the
bond issue financing the construction of the Superdome, and subsequent stadium lease,
represented a pledging of state funds in contravention of the state constitution. Id. at 584,
225 So. 2d at 363. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 12:
The funds, credit, property or things of value of the State, or of any political
corporation thereof, shall not be loaned, pledged or granted to or for any person
or persons, associations or corporations, public or private; nor shall the State,
nor any political corporation, purchase or subscribe to the capital stock or stock
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Exceeding Statutory Borrowing Limitations

In order to protect taxpayers from fiscal overreaching by government officials, state constitutions place restrictions upon the power of
state, county, and municipal governments in the amount of indebtedness they can incur. 163 If the debt service on bonds issued for stadium
of any corporation or association whatever, or for any private enterprise. Nor
shall the State, nor any political corporation thereof, assume the liabilities of
any political, municipal, parochial, private or other corporation or association
whatsoever, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution; nor shall the
State undertake to carry on the business of any such corporation or association,
or become a part owner therein ....
Id. at 598, 225 So. 2d at 368. The court decided that the bonds were not backed by the
full faith and credit of the State of Louisiana and therefore were not debts of the state. Id.
at 599-600, 225 So. 2d at 369. The justices also rejected the argument that the lease
agreement was merely a security agreement to indirectly collateralize the bond issue. Id.
at 601, 225 So. 2d at 369. However, the bonds did create a financial obligation for the
state to finance the Superdome. The language of the state constitution evinces the
framer's intent to restrict government involvement with, and investment in, private enterprises. The lease agreement was a strong indication that the finances of the state were to
be directly intertwined with the New Orleans Saints successes in the Superdome. This
relationship would extend beyond the influence of local enterprises on a state's tax revenues.
An issue related to illegal lending of public credit is whether a transaction, effectively if
not formally, is a gift of public property to a private enterprise. This issue was raised in
City of Tempe v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 22 Ariz. App. 356, 527 P.2d 515, reh'g denied,
(1974), rev. denied, (1975). The court considered whether the city's lease of real property
was a donation of public property, and as such violated a provision of the Arizona constitution which prohibits a city from subsidizing a private corporation. Id. at 358, 527 P.2d
at 517.
ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 7 provides: "Neither the State, nor any county, city,
town, municipality, nor any other subdivision of the State, shall ever give or
loan its credit in the aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation .... "
Id. at 360, 527 P.2d at 519. The lessee constructed a major league baseball spring training
facility upon the land, which was leased at an annual rent of $1 per year. Id. at 360, 527
P.2d at 518. The court rejected the position that a project having a public purpose is
automatically exempt from the provision in the constitution prohibiting a loan or donation to a private party. Id. at 361, 527 P.2d at 519-20. The unanimous opinion of the
court was that the provision could prohibit a donation of public property to a private
corporation even for a purpose that is deemed by the city officials to be for the public
good. Id. at 362, 527 P.2d at 521. This leaves the door slightly ajar for opponents of
stadium projects to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality.
In Rolling Oaks v. Dade County, 492 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1986), the plaintiffs alleged that
transactions culminating in a ninety-nine year lease of land from Dade County to the
Dolphin Stadium Corporation constituted an unlawful gift of public property. Id. at 688.
The court, holding that the use of public property as a sports stadium was a valid public
purpose, dismissed that count of the complaint. Id. Rolling Oaks was one of a number of
cases that unsuccessfully sought to prevent the construction of Joe Robbie Stadium. The
finding of a public purpose was sufficient to legitimize a lending of government credit that
would be otherwise illegal.
163. See 81A C.J.S. States §§ 203, 204 (1977); see generally 20 C.J.S. Counties § 187
(1990); 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations§§ 1846-50 (1950).
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projects is to be repaid from the revenue produced by the stadium,
courts have refused to invalidate the bond issuance on the basis of the
government exceeding its fiscal authority. 1" The theory behind these
holdings is that the government is not incurring a debt which it must
honor. 65 A person challenging a stadium project bears the burden of
showing that a statutory debt limitation will be exceeded.
4. Zoning Challenges
Because of the difficulty in successfully challenging stadium
projects once the legislature has proclaimed that the stadium is a public purpose, and statutory restrictions on public credit are not at issue,
recent challenges to these projects have been based on different theories. Causes of action that have been brought to prevent government
involvement in stadium projects can be grouped into two categories:
(1) zoning violations and (2) other violations of state or local
legislation.
166
In Norwood-Norland Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Dade County,
the plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of the property used for the stadium.1 67 Norwood-Norland was one of a number of challenges to the
164. See e.g. Opinions of the Justices of the House of Representatives, 356 Mass. 775,
250 N.E.2d 547 (1969); Ginsberg v. City and County of Denver, 164 Colo. 572, 436 P.2d
685 (1968).
165. Opinionsof the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 250 N.E.2d 547; Ginsberg, 164 Colo. 572,
436 P.2d 685.
In Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 233 N.E.2d 864 (1968), the court
refused to consider the question of whether the city would exceed its authorized debt
limitation in guaranteeing rent payments for the stadium. Id. at 63, 233 N.E.2d at 864.
The plaintiffs alleged that the city would loan credit to the county beyond the city's
constitutional credit limit by proceeding with the project. Id. at 74, 233 N.E.2d at 872.
The court's refusal was based on procedural reasons. The court decided that there was
inadequate information in the record to determine whether the revenue from the stadium
would be sufficient to cover rental payments due on the stadium. Id. at 67, 233 N.E.2d at
868. If the income stream from the stadium was sufficient to handle the debt service
payments on the bonds, the rent payments would not be considered debts of the city. The
court found that none of the parties raised the issue of whether the obligation of the city
to pay rent on the stadium to the county should be included in calculations of the city's
indebtedness. Id. at 74-75, 233 N.E.2d at 872. These calculations would be done to determine whether the city would exceed constitutional debt limits. Id. This finding disregards
the fact that in a reply memorandum of law the county suggested that the city would
indeed exceed its statutory debt limitation if the rent obligations were included in the
calculation. Id. at 75, 233 N.E.2d at 872. As a principle of jurisprudence the judges decided that, as a court of last resort, it was inappropriate for it to decide an issue that was
not specifically raised by the parties in the proceedings below and by brief in the case at
bar. Id. Therefore, the project was allowed to proceed in spite of indications that the city
might exceed its statutory debt limitations.
166. 511 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied by, 520 So. 2d 585
(1988).
167. 511 So. 2d at 1010.
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construction of a stadium for the Miami Dolphins football
team. 68
' The Florida Circuit Court upheld the rezoning as proper
under Florida state law.' 69 The Florida District Court of Appeal, in
affirming the lower court's opinion, explained that the role of the
court in reviewing zoning determinations was to decide whether the

zoning changes were reasonable, not to substitute its own views for
that of the zoning authority.1 70 In Lake Lucerne Civic Association,
Inc. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp. '7 a case related to Norwood-Norland
Homeowners'Assn., 72 Florida property owners challenged the rezoning of county land to be used for the sports stadium complex alleging
federal civil rights violations. 73 The Eleventh Circuit held that
changes in the zoning relations may violate the federal constitutional
rights of local property owners but remanded the case to the district
174
court for determination of the constitutional issues.

III. Factors that Influence Stadium Project Policies
A local government may decide to proceed with a stadium project
despite potential challenges by taxpayers, property owners or other
citizens. The legislative branch is primarily responsible for determining what constitutes a public municipal purpose, although the determination is subject to review by the courts. 7 5 The courts will not
overrule a legislative determination unless the determination is unmis168. See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1012.
171. 878 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 1132 (1990).
172. 511 So. 2d 1009.
173. Lucerne, 878 F.2d at 1360.
174. There have also been localized challenges to government involvements in stadium
projects. In Hertel v. Racing Commissioner, Department of Agriculture, 68 Mich. App.
191, 242 N.W.2d 526 (1976), the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the funding
source for construction and maintenance of Pontiac Stadium in Pontiac, Michigan. State
legislation provided that cities or counties in which licensed racetracks were located were
to be given a percentage of racetrack revenues as contributions toward the payment of
annual rentals on sports stadiums. The plaintiffs argued that the legislation discriminated
against some Michigan communities in favor of others in that only the Pontiac and Detroit stadiums were eligible for funding under the statute. The judge agreed with the
plaintiffs' view that the section of the legislation drawing the classifications was unconstitutional. Id. at 199, 242 N.W.2d at 529. However, the court found that section to be
severable from the rest of the statute, which was constitutional. Id. at 200, 242 N.W.2d at
530. Therefore the stadium financing project could proceed as planned if expanded to
cover all members of the class that was created by the act. Id. at 199, 242 N.W.2d at 529.
The court approved revenues from one source being diverted from the state coffers to
support stadiums used primarily by major league sports teams. Id.
175. Bazell v. City of Cincinnati, 13 Ohio St. 2d 63, 68, 233 N.E.2d 864, 868-69 (1968)
(quoting State, ex. rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225, 231 (1956)
(citing 37 Am. Jur. 734 § 120)).
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takably arbitrary or unreasonable. 17 6 On the other hand, by including
concrete guidelines for stadium management in enabling statutes, the
legislature can address specific concerns raised in such decisions as
Opinions of the Justices and Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach."'
These courts expressed the concern that some public interests in publicly-owned stadiums would be ignored to satisfy the needs of professional sports teams."1s There are several factors that government
officials should consider when structuring a stadium project to address the concerns that have been expressed by courts and citizens.
A.

Perceived Public Benefits

A local government may decide that there are advantages to the
municipality, county or state in having a stadium located within the
local area. 179 The majority in Kelly v. Marylandersfor Sports Sanity,
Inc. 180 cited a Maryland Legislature committee report indicating that
the proposed baseball stadium would produce $132 million annually
in revenue to the state and the proposed football stadium would produce $59.8 million if a National Football League franchise was ob82
tained."' 1 In Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission,"
the court found that a stadium would provide temporary and permanent jobs as well as increased economic activity in the area.1 83 As the
discussion in Part II indicated, these government reports may be

overly optimistic." 4 The possible variations in lease agreements, tax

rebates, and other details affecting the cost structure of the projects
176. Id. at 68, 233 N.E.2d at 868-69.
177. See supra notes 107-22, 124-30 and accompanying text.
178. Id. During negotiations with team owners, local governmental bodies should educate the public regarding the negotiations and, to the extent possible, seek more public
input before finalizing lease agreements with team owners. See Sport Franchise, supra
note 1, at 526-27. Local governments can use team owners' desire for good public relations to offset the imbalance of negotiating power. Id. at 526. By explaining to the public
the necessity for limiting the concessions the municipality is willing to give to the team,
the local officials can accomplish several objectives. First, the public will be prepared in
case the team leaves, or decides not to enter a lease agreement with stadium authorities.
Id. Second, the team owner, in an endeavor to maintain good public relations, may reduce the team's demands. The owner does not want to alienate the public, especially if
the team decides to play in the local stadium. Id. at 527. Third, the team owner is preempted from using public pressure to coerce public officials into acceding to the team's
demands. Id.
179. Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 356 Mass. 775, 795, 250
N,E.2d 547, 558 (1969).
180. 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987).
181. Id. at 445-46, 530 A.2d at 249. Revenue figures are stated in 1990 dollars. Id.
182. 270 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1978).
183. Id. at 755.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 20-42.
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further complicate comparisons from city to city of the economic impact of hosting sports stadiums.'8
Traditional analysis of the economic justification for building a stadium centers on the tangible, readily ascertainable direct dollar outlay
and income from the stadium." s6 The major expenditures by municipal stadium owners are personnel costs and other services provided
under contractual arrangements. 8 7 Cities may be called upon to provide ground crews, clean-up crews, electricians, plumbers and mainte88
nance personnel, in addition to expanded police protection.1
Moreover, the stadium owner is expected to make capital improvements to the facility. 8 9 If a bond issue is floated to pay for the acquisition or renovation of the stadium, the local government must make
debt service payments whether or not the revenue from the stadium is
sufficient to cover these payments. 90
Local governments may receive stadium-related revenue from four
sources: rental payments, fees from peripheral activities such as parking and concession sales, other payments related to the stadium, and
amusement and admission taxes.' 9 ' The sources of revenue tend to
vary more, in relation to attendance levels, than the required expenditures; stadium costs tend to be less variable. 92 In a time of declining
attendance, or when attendance does not increase as quickly as the
local government's fixed expenses, intangible factors assume a more
significant role in determining whether hosting a sports team is a net
1 93
revenue producer for a city.
B.

The New "Robber Barons"?

The result of the benefits granted to sports teams by local governments is that millions of dollars in public funds are used to support
private enterprises. 94 The consequence of subsidizing these private
enterprises is in many cases higher taxes or reductions in services for
local residents. 95 Voter and taxpayer opposition to the practice of
using public funds to subsidize private baseball and football clubs,
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
See Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 412, 415-20.
Id. at 415; see also Brandes v. City of Deerfield Beach, 186 So. 2d at 12.
Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 415.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 419. Bond payments will be due regardless of the success of a stadium. Id.
Id. at 420.
Aim, supra note 35, at 52.
Id.
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which are frequently owned by millionaires who do not need public
subsidies to undertake the project, 196 appears to be increasing. 197 This
opposition is illustrated by the taxpayer suits brought in Maryland' 98
and Florida' 99 challenging stadium projects mentioned supra.

1. Relative Bargaining Power
Local owners of stadiums, usually public stadium authorities, are
disadvantaged in negotiating with team owners. Professional football
and baseball teams have monopolistic power in negotiating with stadium authorities.2 " Because of the limited number of sports
franchises, local officials lack bargaining power when dealing with
20 2
team owners. 20 ' These officials must lobby for expansion franchises
or attract existing teams by offering substantial subsidies to team
owners.

2.

203

Public and PoliticalPressure
Local officials might reduce the amount of litigation surrounding

stadium projects. This is particularly important if there is a groundswell of public support in favor of keeping, or acquiring, a professional sports team regardless of the public costs. One way to
circumvent lawsuits is by disclosing more information to the public
during the negotiation process. Public hearings are a method for in196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See Kelly v. Marylanders for Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245
(1987); Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, 273 Md. 296, 328
A.2d 305 (1974).
199. Prior to the privately-financed construction of Joe Robbie Stadium in Miami, voters defeated proposals to remodel the Orange Bowl. Short Yardage, supra note 105, at
247. The construction of the stadium survived several suits. See Lake Lucerne Civic Association, Inc. v. Dolphin Stadium Corp., 878 F.2d 1360 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (rezoning challenge brought in federal court on constitutional claims remanded in part to district
court); Rolling Oaks Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So. 2d 686 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (nine count complaint challenging the construction of stadium on
several grounds dismissed), rev. denied, 503 So. 2d 328 (1987); Norwood-Norland Homeowners' Assn., Inc. v. Dade County, 511 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (challenge to district rezoning defeated), rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 585 (1988).
200. See Monopoly, supra note 47, at 656.
201. Id. at 648.
202. Id. Paul Tagliabue, NFL Commissioner, has announced that the National Football League will expand by two teams before 1992. Daily News, March 15, 1990, at 70,
col. 5. The National League in Major League Baseball will add two teams in 1993. Stevenson, Pony Up $95 Million? Sure,for a Baseball Team, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at
F5, col. 1.
203. See Monopoly, supra note 47, at 649.
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creasing public discourse. 20 4 An announcement, followed by legislative action, that a limit will be placed on the time period in which
suits may be brought after a stadium deal has been approved, would
generate early debate over the projects. 20 5 The more pressing concerns raised about the project could be addressed before negotiations
are finalized. Although there will always be a faction of the populace
which opposes the project, intangible factors become very important
when a project has a high expense to low revenue ratio. Such factors
include the boost to civic pride that accompanies the presence of professional sports teams and local public identification with the team.
These intangible factors are strong when the team is winning, but may
be difficult to-sustain in the face of apparent team owner indifference
20 6
or a lack of commitment to a city.
C.

Proposed Stadium Management Strategy

An important factor for local governments to consider is the stadium management strategy to be used in the project. For years, Baltimore elected to forego fees from peripheral activities and accepted
reduced rental payments in lieu of incurring significant levels of debt
by floating bonds to construct a new stadium. 2 7 This strategy gave
the city a low break-even point in calculating the profitability of hosting the Orioles and the Colts. 2 8 The city also experimented with the
Orioles baseball team by signing a series of short-term leases which
called for sharing of the team's profits as opposed to traditional rental
and concession fee payments.20 9 In order to keep the Colts, Maryland
officials agreed to issue $22 million in bonds to finance stadium improvements if the team would enter a fifteen year lease. 210 The Colts'
owner failed to sign a lease within the three-year deadline imposed by
state officials and the team subsequently moved to Indiana."'
Local officials should ensure that lease provisions are sufficient to
protect the public interest. In most cases this can be accomplished
204. See generally id.
205. See generally Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So. 2d 908 (1971) (thirty-day
constitutional preemption placed on challenges of a bond issue was upheld).
206. See Lessons from Baltimore, supra note 3, at 412, 423-25.
207. Id. at 413-15.
208. Id. at 416.
209. Sport Franchise,supra note 1, at 526.
210. Id.
211. Id. As of this writing, the state is constructing a new stadium in downtown Baltimore at a price of $105 million. The National Sports Daily, March 26, 1990, at 14. For
background information concerning the project see Kelly v. Marylandersfor Sports Sanity, Inc., 310 Md. 437, 530 A.2d 245 (1987) (rejecting a challenge to the statutory authority for funding the stadium).
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only by relatively long-term leases of fifteen years or longer.21 2 Team
owners are reluctant to surrender their option to relocate and enter
long-term leases, partially because of short-term profit motives and
the benefits that teams can receive from relocating.2" 3 However, in
order to obtain immediate profits, team officials may be willing to extend the lease period. Therefore, local officials should structure
projects that maximize the short-term profit for the team in return for
long-term commitment. 214 For example, the lease may be structured
to be more favorable to the team in the early years of the project, with
the balance swinging to the municipality in later years.215 In order to
avoid a breach of contract by the team as the lease term progresses,
substantial penalties should be built into the lease agreement.
Local officials should also try to increase the financial and other ties
team owners have with the city.216 This would (1) impose upon the
team owner costs related to leaving the host city and (2) instill a
greater degree of loyalty. 217 For example, Al Davis, the Raiders' principal owner, never sold his Oakland home. 2 8 The owner of the Detroit Tigers reportedly refused to relocate the team because of the
impact the move would have on downtown Detroit. 2 9 As few
franchise shifts have involved a team moving from a privately owned
facility,220 this personal financial stake may represent the ultimate financial tie to the host city.
IV. Conclusion
Local governments have economic, political and cultural incentives
to provide sports facilities for major league professional teams. On the
other hand, taxpayers may resent the investment of public funds in
essentially private enterprises that bestow large profits on already
wealthy team owners. Individuals have sued to prevent government
financing of stadiums for professional sports teams. For the most part,
judicial deference to legislative determinations has resulted in court
approval of the projects. Although principles of federalism may dissuade courts from vigorously reviewing legislative fiscal decisions,
these same principles impose upon the judiciary the role of determin212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Sport Franchise,supra note 1, at 526.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bairn, supra note 21, at 5.
Id.
Anderson, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1990, at D25, col. 1.
See Sport Franchise,supra note 1, at 526.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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ing the constitutionality of the actions of the other branches of government and ensuring that these actions are otherwise in compliance
with existing law. Courts should avoid extreme deference that erodes
the judiciary's "checks and balances" function. To overcome the judicial deference courts have shown towards legislative decisions with
respect to public investment in stadium projects, an opponent of such
a project must generally (1) identify a state constitutional or statutory
provision that may restrict government financing of the project or (2)
show that the project violates local zoning laws. State constitutions
frequently restrict governmental financing or involvement in projects
other than those serving a "public purpose" and prevent the lending
of government credit to private parties. Before initiating a judicial
challenge, a person who opposes a stadium project should review the
state's constitution, laws and the charters of local government subdivisions for restrictive provisions.
Taxpayer resistance to public financing of sports stadiums that will
be used primarily by major league sports teams is supported by studies that show that privately owned stadiums are more economical and
efficient than publicly owned facilities. Also, private ownership
reduces the risks local communities face hosting sports franchises. In
addition to sharing the economic risks involved in stadium management, there is less risk of a team relocating if the team owner has an
interest in the stadium. Because of unequal bargaining power, and the
presence of more stadiums than professional sports teams can occupy,
any specific local government may not be able to negotiate private
ownership with a team owner. Public ownership of sports stadiums is
therefore unlikely to end in the near future.
There are several steps local officials may take to forestall court
challenges to public investment in stadiums. Municipalities and other
local governments should only borrow funds or expend existing funds
for outdoor stadium projects, assuming compliance with the other
provisions in enabling legislation, if sufficient safeguards are implemented to protect the public's economic and civic interests. These
safeguards may include sharing the revenue of the stadium in partnerships with team owners or more traditional lease agreements. These
agreements should ensure repayment of the investment, in both dollar
amounts and public relations, the municipality and its citizens have
made in hosting a professional team. The presence of private capital
investment in the project will improve team loyalty and reduce the
risk of franchise relocation.
In entering lease negotiations, local officials should define the nature of the relationship between the municipality and the team. Gov-
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ernment officials can accomplish this by keeping the public informed
about the negotiations and the limits of the concessions the government is willing to make.
The stadium management strategy selected by local officials, such
as avoiding long-term debt by sharing ballpark parking and concession fees, has an effect on the amount of subsidies the official can give
to the team without placing the local government or its taxpayers at a
financial disadvantage. Before agreeing to assume long-term debt, local officials should either seek to extend the lease period to match the
maturity of the bonds, or find other ways to minimize the time needed
for the project to break even. A thorough review of all pertinent factors can make the acquisition and maintenance of sports stadiums a
winning proposition for cities.
Pamela Edwards

